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We analyze the advice contained in a sample of 237 investment letters over the 1980-1992
period. Each newsletter recommends a mix of equity and cash. We construct portfolios based
on these recommendations and find that only a small number of the newsletters appear to have
higher average returns than a buy-and-hold portfolio constructed to have the same variance.
Knowledge of the asset allocation weights also implies knowledge of the exact conditional betas.
As a result, we present direct tests of market timing ability that bypass beta estimation problems.
Assuming that different letters cater to investors with different risk aversions, we are able to
imply the newsletters' forecasted market returns. The dispersion of the newsletters' forecasts
provides a natural measure of disagreement in the market. We find that the degreeof
disagreement contains information about both market volatility and trading activity.
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Student: Do investment newsletters have any value?
Professor: You get what you pay for.
Sound familiar? There are hundreds maybe thousands of investment newsletters.
Most of us, at some point in time, have been asked to recommend or give a general
opinion on the value of investment newsletters. The authors of these newsletters
often play a prominent role in the media. Given the sizable subscription base, a
number of investors appear to value these services.
Our paper is the first effort analyze the information contained in investment
newsletters. We evaluate the performance of 237 newsletters from June 1980 to
December 1992. These newsletters recommend investment weights for cash and
equity. That is, rather than concentrating on specific equity recommendations,
these newsletters' attempt to call the direction of the market as a whole.1
Our work provides an interesting contrast to the work on mutual fund per-
formance evaluation. Indeed, our tests have two important advantages over the
mutual fund studies. First, our portfolios are simple (equity and cash) and we
can construct portfolios that exactly mimic the newsletters' recommendations.
Transactions costs are born by the investor (the only management fee is the sub-
scription price). Many investors might choose to manage the recommendations
by trading in the Standard and Poor's 500 futures contract along with a money
market deposit to minimize transactions costs.
With mutual funds, it is impossible to replicate holdings. Grinblatt and
Titman (1989), for example, expend painstaking effort to collect the end-of-quarter
holdings of over 500 mutual funds at the Security and Exchange Commission.
This allows them to construct passive portfolios of the same equities held by the
There are a number of studies that focus on the stock picking ability of
analysts, see for example, Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983),Dimson
and Marsh (1984), Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum and Lease (1979), Elton,Gruber
and Grossman (1986) and Womack (1994).
1mutual fund and to estimate the transactions costs that the funds incur. This
is an important study, however, the end-of-quarter holdings may not accurately
reflect mutual fund activity within a quarter.
The second advantage of our newsletter sample is that it does not suffer from
some of the acute survivorship biases that plague many previous mutual fund
studies [see Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992)]. Even a number of
recent studies of performance evaluation such as Ferson and Schadt (1994), Chen
and Knez (1993) and Bansal and Harvey (1994) use long samples of monthly data
of mutual fund survivors. That is, to be included in the sample, these papers
require that the fund has survived for at least 22 years. If such a rule were used
in our study, we would be left with only 13 of the 237 newsletters.
We investigate a number of interesting issues. Given our knowledge of the
investment weights, our study analyzes the market timing abilities of the newslet-
ters. We investigate whether recommended equity weights increase before the
market rises. In addition, if we assume that there is common knowledge of time-
varying expected returns, we test whether the investment recommendations add
anything beyond the common expected returns. We define extra market timing
ability as correctly anticipating the direction of the market when the economy-
wide expectation about the direction of the market is incorrect.
The second interesting issue concerns the information in the newsletters' fore-
casts. 'While the newsletters only provide asset weights, we imply the expected
returns by assuming an exponential utility function. We allow risk aversion to
differ across newsletters —butassume that risk aversion is constant through time.
We form mean and median newsletter market forecasts and investigate how these
forecasts relate to the expected returns implied by a statistical model. We also
investigate a weighting scheme that rewards good past forecasting performance by
lowering the weight on past poor performance in developing a consensus forecast.
Finally, we explore the information in the dispersion of newsletter forecasts.
Is more disagreement associated with higher volatility and volume? To this end,
we test whether changes in dispersion are related to changes in both future realized
volatility and future implied volatility from options prices.
2Our results indicate that fewer than 25% of. the investment letters achieve
returns greater than a volatility-matched buy-and-hold equity/cash portfolio. In
addition, the newsletters' ability to time the market is unimpressive. It is rare that
the equity allocation weights increase before the market goes up and the economy
wide expectation of market returns is negative. This suggests that, in most cases,
investment letters do not provide any information over and above that which
is publicly available. Consistent with mutual fund studies, we detail significant
persistence in investment letter performance. Past performance is a predictor of
future performance. However, past performance is almost always poor.
When we imply the aggregate forecasted market returns, we find that these
predictions have little information about future returns. While the magnitudeof
forecast is not that informative, the standard deviation is important. We present
evidence that the dispersion of the investment letter forecasts Granger causes
future volatility, future implied volatility and future trading volume.
Our paper is organized as follows. The second section details the nature of the
data and provides some summary statistics. Direct measures of market timing are
investigated in the third section. This section also presents the tests of persistence
in the investment letter performance. The fourth section presents an analysis of
the relation between forecast dispersion, volume and volatility. Some concluding
remarks are offered in the final section.
2. The data
2.1 Sources
We have data, provided by Source,2 on 237 newsletters over the 13 years ending
in December 1992. Source collects data on a comprehensive sample ofnewsletters
and compiles data on the ones that provide concrete recommendations.Each
observation satisfies the restriction that long+short +cash-margifl100%. The
date an observation is added to the raw file is the date Source receivesit in the
2Thename of Source will be revealed before publication ofthis research.
3mail —ratherthan the date published on the newsletter. Our data has essentially
no survivorship bias problem because funds are added on the day Source first
receives the letter; no data are deleted when a newsletter ceases to exist.
There are 15,172 total recommendations (across all newsletters). This actu-
ally overstates the number of observations to a small degree because Source always
imputes a year-end and year-beginning forecast for every newsletter in existence.
even if their forecast did not change between, say, November 1990 and February
1991. The first observation for any newsletter is in June 1980; the last possible
observation is December 1992. Thirteen newsletters exist for the entire sample.
In the raw data, an observation can occur on any day during a month, and
multiple observations may occur in any month. However, for our tests, we will con-
centrate on monthly recommendations. This allows us to link our work with the
growing literature on conditional performance measurement —whichuses monthly
data. To this end, we use the last observation in a month as our "monthly" as-
set weight recommendation.3 We also "add" observations for months in which a
newsletter exists, but did not change its forecast. For example, if a newsletter
provides only a January forecast in a particular year, we assign twelve monthly
observations. These additions should not bias the newsletters' performances. If
recommendations are made quarterly, it is reasonable to assume that the portfolio
weights are constant over the three months of the quarter. We do, however, make
one exception to the addition rule. If a letter explicitly withdraws a previous fore-
cast without making a new forecast, we do not carry forward the old forecasts.
The net result of our deletion of intramonth recommendations and our addition
of recommendations leaves us with 15,133 observations.
Source may "clarify" the data if a newsletter is vague in its recommenda-
tions. For example, if a newsletter is 50% long the market and 50% in cash,
but recommends a one-month hedge against the long, Source may impute a 50%
short-in-futures-market with a 50% margin; this hedges the long position but
avoids transaction costs for closing out the long position. For consistency across
Later in the paper, we assess the sensitivity our results to this simplifying
assumption by acting on the recommendation the day the investment letter is
received using the daily S&P 500 returns.
4our data, however, in situations where both long and short positions are greater
than zero we take the net position and assign the remainder to cash. In the pre-
vious example, we would classify the fund 100% cash. We assume that the cash
instrument return is the 30-day Treasury bill rate.
Newsletters can recommend a ma.rgin position, for example, 200% long in
the market. In such a case, the letter earns twice the market return minus the
margin-rate. The margin-rate is provided is also provided by Source.
We have not restricted any fund to a maximum long position of 200, although
security regulations do impose this restriction. Indeed, we will see that one fund
often recommends long positions much greater than 200. A short return is simply
the opposite of the market return for the month.
We assume that round-trip transactions costs are 1 percent. So, for example,
if a newsletter is long 80% one month and long 20% the following month (and
initially cash 20% and then cash 80%), transaction costs are .005x(80-20)/100
for the second month. This level of transactions costs is attainable by discount
brokers and is conservative if one elects to manage the newsletter portfolios using
the S&P 500 futures. There are also a number of mutual funds that allow investors
to switch (at no charge for the switch) between the family of funds once a month.
2.2 Summary statistics and nonparametric evaluation
Table 1 presents the preliminary analysis of the newsletter performance, with and
without transactions costs. The first entry is not a newsletter but the statistical
forecasting model presented in Harvey (1989). This model was originallyfit over
1959—1986 and uses the following instrumental variables to forecast the market
return: the lagged excess return on the CRSP NYSE equally-weighted index,the
lagged excess return on a 3-month Treasury bill, the lagged Moody'sBaa-Aaa yield
We are sensitive to the issue of data snooping. The original paper,submitted
to the Western Finance Association program on November 24, 1987,used data
from February 1959—December 1986. The published version of the articleextended
the data back to 1941 and forward to December 1987.
5spread, the lagged excess dividend yield on the S&P 500 index, and a January
dummy variable. While there is some danger that the statistical model has been
overfit, all forecasts beginning in January 1987 are out of sample.
The benchmark statistical model return is formed as follows. A linear re-
gression model is estimated with the stock market returns through time t and
information variables through time t —1.The estimated coefficients are applied
to the information variables at time t to forecast the market return in t + 1. If
the forecasted market return is above the known 30-day Treasury bill rate, then a
100% market position is formed. If the forecasted return is less than the bill rate,
then a 100% cash position is initiated. At the end of each month, the regression
model's parameters are reestimated and new forecasts are calculated.
In terms of mean-variance analysis, the idea of the strategy is to be on the
positively sloping portion of the mean-variance frontier which includes only two
assets. Conditionally, the frontier looks like a sideways "V." The 30-day Treasury
bill has exactly zero conditional variance because next month's return is deter-
mined by the discount from par value. Any time the expected excess market
return is negative, all the allocation goes to the bill.5 This strategy will almost
always result in a volatility less than or equal to the volatility of the market
return.6 We also report the forecasts implied by an equally-weighted portfolio of
all of the newsletter portfolios and an equally-weighted portfolio with newsletters
in existence for more than four years.
First, consider the unconditional performance of the statistical model. Over
There are a number of variants of this strategy which we did not pursue. One
simple refinement is to place a filter on the market entries. That is, if the forecasted
market return is only a few basis points above the forecasted equity return, it does
not make sense to enter the risky market and incur the transactions costs. One
could also allow for short positions if the forecasted market return is negative. A
further refinement would be to impose a constant level of risk aversion over the
sample which would lead to mixed cash and equity positions. We chose to pursue
the simplest possible strategy; the act of refining the statistically based strategy
may lead to another level of data snooping.
6Itis possible that frequent switching from cash to equity could induce more
volatility that an equity buy and hold. However, this possibility only exists if the
volatility of the equity returns is very small —whichis not the case in our sample.
6the entire period, the average performance before (after) transactions costs was
17.1% (15.4%) per annum. The return to a buy-and-hold strategy of the S&P
500 cash index over the same period produced 15.9% (15.8%) per annum on aver-
age. However, the volatility of the statistical model's portfolio is 12.4% compared
to 15.9% for the S&P buy-and-hold strategy. Over the same period, an equally
weighted portfolio of all the newsletter portfolios produced a 11.3% (10.9%) aver-
age return with an 8.4% volatility.
While it is clear that the statistical model unconditionally dominates (higher
mean and lower variance, in a two moment framework) the S&P buy-and-hold
strategy before transactions costs, these numbers are difficult to interpret. As
a result, we provide two nonparametric measures of performance. These simple
measures are nonparametric in the sense that no asset pricing model has been
imposed. The metrics are designed to compare the newsletter performance with
the fixed investment weight equity/cash strategy on the basis of the same volatility.
In our first measure, we lever a S&P 500 portfolio up or down in order to set
its unconditional volatility equal to the unconditional volatility of the newsletter
portfolio return over matching samples. For example, if the newsletter volatility
was 8%, a portfolio of approximately 50% cash and 50% equity (assumingthe
S&P 500 volatility is 16%) with the weights held constant in every month, is
constructed to mimic the active newsletter portfolio's volatility. The difference
between the returns on the newsletter portfolio and the constructed portfolio
provides a measure of abnormal return.7 While this gives us a nonparametric
measure of performance for the newsletter, it is still difficult to compare across
newsletters. For example, most would consider a 1% annual abnormal return for
a 8% volatility newsletter portfolio more impressive than a 1.1%annual abnormal
return for a 16% volatility newsletter portfolio.
Our second measure addresses the comparability issue. We lever the newslet-
ter portfolio strategy to have the same volatility as the 100%S&P 500 buy-
and-hold strategy over matching samples. For example, we would transform the
The levered buy-and-hold portfolio is not a passive portfolio. That is, to keep
the constant asset weights some rebalancing is necessary each month. We subtract
the transactions costs associated with rebalancing in calculating the returns.
7newsletter portfolio to have 15.9% average volatility if the newsletter existed for
the full sample period.8 The difference between the newsletter portfolio return
and the S&Preturnprovides a natural measure of "abnormal" returns, where
abnormal is defined in the context of the S&P 500 benchmark.9
The statistical model provides 110 basis points more return after transactions
costs than the unlevered S&P 500 return portfolio with volatility set at 12.4%
(measure 1, Table 1, column 7). 'When the statistical model is levered to produce
15.9% volatility (same as the S&P 500), it provides l4Obp extra annualreturn
after transactions costs (measure 2, Table 1, column 8). The statistical model
provides 370bp and 630bp extra return for these two measures, respectively, over
the period 1987 to 1992, which is out-of-sample from the original Harvey (1989)
analysis.
The equally-weighted newsletter portfolio does not fare well by our two non-
parametric measures. The newsletter portfolio provides l5Obp lower return than
the S&P when the cash/equity volatility is set to 8.4%. The levered newsletter
portfolio delivers 420bp less return when its volatility is increased to 15.9%.
An examination of the results for individual newsletters shows dramatic dif-
ferences in performance. One of the highest profile letters, the Granville Market
Letter—Traders Portfolio, lost 5.4% per annum over the past 13 years. The Zweig
—Short-termTrend Indicator (with shorting) forecast has lost 6.8% per year since
1984. The Elliott Wave Theorist—Traders lost 14.8% per year since December
1985.
8 We solve for w such that =w2 cret+(1_w)24D+2w(1_w)COv[RLet, RTBI,
where SP represents the Standard and Poor's 500 cash index, TB is the 30-day
Treasury bill, and Let is the investment newsletter portfolio.
Measure 2 is similar to a Sharpe ratio which tells the amount of expected
return per unit of volatility.
10 This performance is obviously influenced by the crash observation. The sta-
tistical model correctly forecasts a negative excess return for October 1987 which
takes the portfolio of the market. This increases the average annual returns by
320bp and lowers the volatility. Omitting this observation, the measure 1 and 2
abnormal returns are llObp and l8Obp, respectively. These are consistent with
the results for the full sample.
8There are impressive individual performances also. Bob Nihrock's Advisory—
TMI—(no shorting) produced annual returns of 22.5% per year from 1980." The
Medical Technology Stock Letter delivered 29.7% annual returns since December
1985. The Fidelity Monitor produced 24.7% per year since December 1986. How-
ever, most letters produce negative abnormal profits according to the two nonpara-
metric measures. 200 of 237 (84.4%) of the letters produced negative abnormal
returns when compared to the cash/equity strategy with equal volatility (Table
1, column 7). 183 of 237 (77.3%) of the letters also produced negative abnormal
returns when the newsletter portfolios were levered to have the same volatility as
the S&P 500 (Table 1, column 8).12
Although the paper is based on monthly data, we assessed the implication of
our assigning end-of-month recommendations to newsletters that produced recom-
mendations before the end of the month. Using daily S&P 500 data, the measures
in table 1 were replicated for a random sample of newsletters. The average per-
formance metrics based on the daily data were similar to the monthly averages.
A visual presentation of the data is contained in Figure 1. Panel A presents
the average returns and volatilities measured over the full sample that each
newsletter portfolio is available. That is, the points on the graph represent the
unconditional mean and standard deviation of the newsletter strategies (which are
potentially calculated over different time periods). There is one distinct outlier,
the Wall Street Generalist, which has a volatility of 60.8% (and is omitted from
the graph). Overlaid on this graph is the unconditional performance of the sta-
tistical model (diamond), the equally-weighted newsletter return (circle) and the
S&P portfolio calculated over the full sample (star). Immediately below, in panel
C, is the same graph with the data subset from January 1987. This provides a
more meaningful comparison with the statistical model's out-of-sample forecasts.
This graph is very similar to the one in panel A. The performance of the statistical
However, Bob Nurock has seven letters in the database. Bob Nurock's Advi-
sory,incontrast to TMI, has on average lost 11.8% per year since inception.
12 The percentages, 84.4% and 77.3%, need not be the same for the two mea-
sures. With sufficient variance, measure 1 could be negative and measure 2 could
be positive.
9model improves and the equally-weighted newsletter deteriorates moving from one
sample to the next.
The final panels of Figure 1 select only the newsletters that make recommen-
dations for more than four years. We impose this selection criteria because, later
in the paper, we need to infer the newsletter's average taste for risk. We believe
that a meaningful estimate of risk aversion should span at least the average length
of the business cycle, which is about four years in our sample. However, the four-
year rule could induce a survivorship bias. Italso eliminates all newsletters that
entered the database after January 1989. Interestingly, the performance of this
sample is similar to the uncensored sample. From Table 1, the average uncensored
newsletter return is 10.9% with a volatility of 8.4%. The censored sample has an
average return of 10.7% and a volatility of 8.1%. Comparing panelsA and B of
Figure 1, many of the highest mean return newsletters as well as the lowest mean
return newsletters are omitted with the four year rule.
Figure 2 summarizes the nonparametric performance of the newsletter port-
folios. First, both the abnormal measures give similar results with about 20% of
the newsletter portfolios falling in the positive range. Second, the distribution
of performance is skewed towards poor performance. Third, there are no obvi-
ous effects from imposing the four year rule for sampling —thedistribution of
performance appears quite similar.
3. Assessing market timing abilities
3.1 Traditional timing measures
The literature on evaluation of mutual fund managers tries to measure two aspects
of performance: the ability to pick stocks and the ability to time the market. The
first aspect is not relevant to our study since the investment letters recommend
positions in only two broad asset classes. One of the goals of the paper is to
determine whether the newsletters have any ability to call the direction of the
market (or time the market).
10A number of studies have tried to both allow for the possibility of market
timing and to measure its effectiveness. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) proposed a
quadratic regression:
TM TM TM2 TM —c+ p1Tmg+ yir,71 + (1)
Successful market timing would be indicated if 7TM > 0. This implies that the
beta of the portfolios increases when the market return is large in absolute value.
Merton (1981) and Merton and Henriksson (1981) propose an alternative model
where the linear regression is augmented with a slope dummy variable.
= MH + + yj'"I(rt) x Tmt + (2)
where I(r) is an indicator variable that is on if the market return is positive.
This nonlinearity is of the piece-wise form (compared to the previous quadratic
form) and Merton and Henriksson give an option interpretation to market timing.
Successful market timing implies that -yf111>0.
Market timing involves a shifting of the individual stocks within the portfolio.
However, the response of the manager may vary depending upon the economic
signals she receives. While the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) and the Merton-Henriksson
(1981) models capture some nonlinearity in the risk, the functional form may be
too rigid.
Ferson and Schadt (1994) offer an important innovation in performance mea-
surement. They introduce time-varying conditional betas in both of the standard
models to allow the manager's portfolio response to be a function of economic
conditions. The beta is assumed to be a linear function of lagged economy-wide
information variables. This allows Ferson and Schadt to test whether managers
are altering their portfolio mix with economy-wide information and to isolate the
information which has the most impact on portfolio rebalancing. They also pro-
pose tests to determine whether managers use information over and above the
assumed market information in setting their market mix.
113.2 A direct measure of market timing
One advantage to our newsletter sample is that we do not need to estimate the
conditional betas. That is, given that we know the weights, we know the condi-
tional beta exactly. For example, a newsletter with a 100% market equity weight
has a beta of 1.0. Since we assume that the cash instrument is the 30-day Trea-
sury bill, a 100% in cash position implies the conditionalbeta is 0.0. Hence, we
bypass any estimation error in the risk estimates and we do not have to worry
about issues relating to whether the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient.
We can directly model market timing ability by estimating the model:
=6i,1+ c5w,t + + e,t+i (3)
where W2trepresentsthe change in net equity position at the end of month t, and
Zisa set of common information variables available at time t. If the coefficient
6i2 >0,this means that on average the newsletter is increasing (decreasing) equity
weights before the market excess return is positive (negative).
The model in (3) focusses on the actions taken by the portfolio manager
rather than on the actual position. For example, a reduction in equity from
100% to 50% when the market subsequently decreased is considered to be positive
market timing ability. However, this does not imply the final position was optimal
in any sense. Indeed, in this example, it would have been better to shift the weight
by 200% rather than 50%. To help address the level issue, we estimate a model
identical to (3) using the demeaned levels ofas an explanatory variable. This
tells us whether the portfolio has a higher (lower) equity weight, relative to its
average weight, when the market return increases (decreases).
We also investigate differential abilities to time the market in up and down
states. We segment (3) and run separate estimations for negative and positive
market returns. In addition, we run an indicator regression, inspired by Merton-
Henriksson (1981), that allows us to measure differential responses:
A_ T(+\ T( 4 — Ui21 rm,t+1)+Uj3J rm,t+1)+fj,t1,
where I(.) is the same type of indicator variable as in (2). Notice that the market
return is omitted from this regression. Essentially, (4) tells us the average increase
12(decrease) in equity weights when the market rises (falls). For reasons discussed
previously, an alternate to (4) with the demeaned w1t as the dependent variable
is also estimated in order to focus on the actual position of the newsletter.
The results of estimating (3) and (4) for each newsletter are presented in Table
2. There is no statistically significant evidence of market timing for newsletters
as a group. The first panel shows the coefficient on the weightvariable is positive,
albeit insignificantly so, for the pooled regression. A positive coefficient indicates
that equity weights are increasing (decreasing) before the future market return is
positive (negative). However, newsletter by newsletter, the coefficientis positive
for only 46.5% of the portfolios.
The second and third panel present results of estimating (3) separately on
positive and negative market returns. Equity investment weightsincrease before
market upturns for 58.1% of the letters. However, in the pooled regression, the
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. However, equity weights also
increase before market downturns for 53.1% of the letters. Similar to the up-
market regression, the pooled coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
The indicator variable specification in (4) presents similar results. In the
pooled regression, the point estimates of the coefficients suggestthat market
weights decrease by 0.03 before positive market returns and increase by0.11 before
negative market returns. However, neither of these coefficients arestatistically dif-
ferent from zero. Of the individual investment letters, 42.5% increased weights
before positive returns and 42.3% decreased weights before negative returns.
Similar results are obtained when the demeaned values of the investment
weights are used as the dependent variable. In (3), the coefficientis negative in
the pooled regression which is the incorrect sign. Furthermore, for theindividual
investment letters only 36.1% of the sample had positive coefficients.The results
for (4) are also unfavorable for the letters: only 37.3% of the portfolioshad equity
weights above normal before the market rose and 36.8% had equityweights below
normal before the market declined. Again, neither of the coefficients aredifferent
from zero at conventional levels.
133.3 Market timing and conditioning information
Market timing implies an investor has the ability to earn "abnormal" returns. Of
course, one difficulty comes in the definition of abnormal. Most market timing
studies have been executed within the paradigm of constant risk (for the under-
lying securities) and constant risk premiums. Viewed within the context of these
assumptions, the statistical model produces l4Obp abnormal return. That is, the
portfolio return implied by the statistical model's forecasts which has the same
volatility as the S&P 500 buy-and-hold, delivers l4Obp return over and above the
S&P 500 buy-and-hold strategy
However, most would not consider the statistical model's performance ab-
normal. Some predictable variation in returns is expected. That is, if we move
away from the constant risk/constant risk premium framework, predictability in
returns may naturally arise. Indeed, Ferson and Harvey (1991) show that 85%
of the predictability in U.S. portfolio returns can be explained by time-varying
risks and risk premiums. They show that risk premiums are high near business
cycle troughs and low near business cycle peaks. As a result, it is important that
our market timing tests allow for some natural degree of predictability. In (3),
common information variables enter the regression. Nevertheless, we would like
to be more precise about the nature of market timing.
There is some controversy, however, as to whether the time-variation in the
expected returns is genuine or an artifact of data snooping [see discussions in
Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Foster and Smith (1994) and Black (1993)]. We do
not purport to resolve this controversy. However, as mentioned earlier, we have
taken special care to make sure that the statistical model is analyzed based on an
out-of-sample fit beginning in January 1987.
We measure the timing skill over and above the common level of timing inher-
ent in the base-line predictability. Extra timing skill is evident if market weights
increase before future positive market returns and common expected returns are
negative. Similarly, successful timing is indicated if market weights decrease when
future returns are negative and the common expected returns are positive. The
14former scenario implies that the common knowledge expectation results in large
positive forecast errors and the latter scenario implies large negative forecast er-
rors. Extra timing skill implies a positive relation between the changes in weights
and the forecast errors.
The following model provides a test for extra timing skill:
=o+ 0i2I(r4,t+l & 0i3I(rrn,t+l & E[rm,t+i])
5
+ 9i4I(r,t÷l & Et[rm,t+i]) + Oi5I(Trn,t+l & Ei[rm,t+iJ) +
If the newsletters are correctly interpreting the common information about the
conditional means (holding conditional variances constant), both 04 > 0 and 05 <
0. Positive values of 02 and negative values of 03 indicate extra timing ability.
Likewise, coefficients 02 > 0 and 93 < 0 from the regression with the demeaned
value ofas dependent variable indicate that the weights are above or below
average at times which correctly defy the common market expectation.
The results of estimating a pooled version of (5) are presented in table 2
and individual portfolio estimations are summarized in figure 3. The signs of the
coefficients which measure the correct interpretation of common information are
correct in panel A. However, only 50.3% of investment letters decrease weights
when both the expected and actual market return was negative and only 48.5%
increase weights when both expected and actual returns are positive. Similar re-
sults are found in the demeaned weight levels in panel B. Portfolios are 8.55%
below the average equity weight when both expected and actual returns are nega-
tive. The portfolios have 4.16% above average market weights when both expected
and actual returns are positive. These coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
There is no evidence that the investment portfolios exhibit any extra market
timing. Portfolio weights increase in 62.6% of the cases when the expected mar-
ket returns are positive and the realized returns are negative. Portfolio weights
decrease in 60.0% of the cases when the expected market return is negative and
the realized return is positive. In the demeaned market weights in panel B, the
absence of extra market timing is evident at the 10% level of significance.
Of course, a newsletter may decrease the weight in the market even if the
excess market return is expected to be positive because the market variance is
15forecasted to increase. While we focus on the conditional means, we also report in
the last rows of Table 2 a version of (5) which allows for both changing conditional
means and variances. The number of indicator variables is increased to eight (4
for increasing expected volatility and 4 four decreasing expected volatility). Four
of the indicators have unambiguous signs. For example, if the market goes up and
volatility is forecasted to decrease, then the equity weight should increase. The
unambiguous coefficients are presented in bold typeface.
Allowing for time-varying volatility does not improve the the performance
newsletter recommendations. In situations when the market is expected to go
up and it does, only 48.5% of the newsletters increase equity weights (04).If
we subset the dates when volatility was expected to decrease, there are fewer
newsletters recommending increased weights, 47.0%. A similar picture emerges
from the case when both the expected and realized market returns are negative.
Using all the data, 50.3% of the letters recommended increased investment weights
(05).Subsettingthe situations when volatility was expected to increase, 60.9%
recommended higher equity weights. Neither of these proportions are impressive:
ideally, they should both be near 0.0%. This suggests that subsetting by volatility
predictions causes a deterioration in the newsletter performance.
Subsetting the data leads to slightly better performance in the extra market
timing measures. When the market goes up but the expected return was negative,
only 40% of the newsletters increased investment weights (02).However,if we
further subset to isolate situations where volatility was expected to decrease, 58.3%
of the newsletters increased investment weights. Similarly, when the expected
return was positive and the realized return negative (03),62.6%of the letters
were increasing market weights. However, if we examine the dates when expected
volatility was increasing, a reduced percentage, 52.6%, recommended increasing
weights. Overall, the evidence suggests that allowing for time-varying variances
in addition to conditional means, has little impact on the newsletters' timing
abilities.
163.4 Does good performance indicate good future performance?
There are a number of studies which suggest that mutual fluid performance
persists.13 One common problem with these studies, as pointed out by Lehmann
and Modest (1987), is that the evidence of persistence could be sensitive to the
method used to compute risk-adjusted returns. The risk adjustment problem is
also highlighted by Harvey (1992) who reports that aggressive growth funds show
twice the persistence of balanced and growth mutual funds. This relation between
risk and persistence suggests that an incorrect risk adjustment may induce some
of the persistence.
While it is impossible to bypass the risk adjustment issue, at least we do
not need to worry about the estimation of the conditional betas. We subset our
portfolio returns into three four-year periods. The cross-section of the abnormal
returns (measure 2) in the second period is regressed on the abnormal returns in
the first period. The regression is re-estimated for the second and third periods.
We also report a pooled regression. These results are presented in Table 3.
The persistence of performance is much more evident in investment letter
returns than in mutual fund returns. The persistence coefficients in the first and
second periods are 0.83 and 0.62, respectively. In addition, there is an important
similarity between investment letter and mutual fund performance persistence: the
results are being driven by poor performance. For example, in Harvey's (1992)
analysis of aggressive growth funds in the 1982—1988 period, only 15 of 67 funds
had positive abnormal returns in any of the two periods and none of the funds had
positive abnormal returns in both three year periods. Similarly, Figure 4 shows
that only 3 of 46 had positive abnormal performance in consecutive periods. That
is, the evidence of persistence is being driven by negative performance.
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) argue that some persistence
13SeeElton and Gruber (1989), Grinblatt and Titman (1988), Lehmann and
Modest (1987), Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1991) and Goetzmann and Tb-
botson (1994). Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) argue that the
findings of persistence could be sensitive to the survivorship bias problemin the
data.
17is induced by the survivorship bias problem. It is possible that our requiring
newsletters to exist in two consecutive four-year periods in the previous regression
analysis could induce persistence. In response to this, we present a nonparametric
analysis of persistence. Table 3 shows that after one year of outpacing the S&P
portfolio (measure 2), there is only a 37.3% chance that the newsletter portfolio
will outperform this portfolio in the following year. If the newsletter portfolio
produced two consecutive years of extra returns, the probability that itwill suc-
ceed in the next year is 47.6%. For three and four years, the probabilities are
45.2% and 54.5%, respectively. The evidence of persistence is far less impressive
using the nonparametric approach which supports the Brown etal. argument that
survivorship could induce spurious persistence.
Table 3 also investigates the persistence of negative abnormal returns. Given
one year of negative abnormal returns, there is a 67.6% chance thatthe next
year will be negative. With two negative abnormal return years,there is a 66.5%
chance that the next year will be also be negative. The probabilities increase
to 71.1% and 76.2% over the next two years.14 In addition, the frequencies of
the negative abnormal return runs are much greater than the positive abnormal
returns runs. For example, 168 newsletter year observations meet the criteriaof
three consecutive negative abnormal return years. This is sharply higher than
the 30 newsletter year observations associated with three consecutive positive
abnormal return years.
4. The information in newsletters' forecasts
4.1 Implied expected returns
Our sample includes recommendations of asset allocation weights —notmarket
forecasts. However, it is possible to impute the newsletters' forecasts of the market
return. If we assume that the newsletter subscribers have negative exponential
14 Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1994) find evidence of performance
persistence is concentrated on managers with negative conditional performance.
18utility and returns are normally distributed, expected returns onthe individual
assets in portfolio i, E[r], can be expressed as:
E[r] =)Lw2, (7)
where E is the variance-covariance matrix of asset returns, w1 are the weights in
the portfolio and A is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In our problem, there is only one risky asset, the market portfolio. Given an
estimate of the variance of the market, the variance of the conditionally expected
returns, the unconditional mean return, and the known weights, we caninfer the
risk aversion of each newsletter.'5 To make the average returns andvariances
meaningful, we require at least four years of monthly data.This ensures that
the returns span the average length of one business cycle. We assumethat all
investors agree on the unconditional means and variances.
Importantly, this technique allows for different risk aversions acrossnewslet-
ters. An examination of the average recommended weightsreveals that newsletters
appeal to different cienteles of investors with different riskaversion. In our sam-
ple, the risk aversion coefficients range from 1.96 forthe Wall Street Generalist
which, as noted before, had a portfolio volatility 60.8% per annumto 16.50 for
the Professional Timing Service—(no shorting) which had a volatilityof only 7.1%
(with an average of 60% of funds in cash). The mean (median)risk aversion is
7.19 (6.93): the frequency distribution is presented in Figure 5.These implied risk
aversion coefficients are similar to the average ratio of expected excessreturn to
variance over the 13 year sample, 6.29, and to the average riskaversion estimates
presented in Campbell (1987) and Harvey (1989).
The risk aversion is calculated using the unconditional varianceand expected
returns. To infer the time-series of conditionally expected returns,we calculate:
=AE[o+1]wt. (8)
'5This intuition follows French and Poterba (1991) who use data on aggregate
investment weights in the U.S. and Japan to infer the expectedreturns in the two
markets. They present results which assume that )..isequal to three. We solve
for ) in E[rI =)(Var[r]Var[E{rZ}J)w.
19The constant risk aversion is multiplied by both the time-varying expected volatil-
ity proxy and the time-varying weights. We assume that all investors have the
same forecast of volatility.'6
We use the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic ity
(GARCH) model proposed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) to obtain the
volatility forecasts. The specific implementation follows French, Schwert and
Stambaugh (1987) and Schwert and Seguin (1990) in that monthly ex post vari-
ances are calculated from daily S&P 500 returns from 1959—1992. Also similar to
these papers, we estimate a GARCH(1,1) model. However, there are two differ-
ences. First, our specification of the mean follows the statistical model which uses
five instrumental variables. Second, we initially fit the model with data through
1980:05 and obtain an out-of-sample volatility forecast for 1980:06. At every
month, the estimation is repeated until we have a complete series of out-of-sample
volatilities.
Table 4 analyzes the imputed newsletter predictions. We present both the
mean and median newsletter forecast as well as the forecasts from the statistical
model. Strong evidence in favor of looking at the mean forecast is provided by
Clemen (1989) who concludes that a simple average is the best method of com-
bining forecasts across a wide range of forecasting environments. In the spirit of
Clemen and Winkler (1986), we use an alternative approach which averages fore-
casts by weighting each recommendation inversely by the square the newslettefs
previous forecast error.
Some summary statistics on the predictions are presented in Table 4. We
examine the full sample with and without the October 1987 observation as well
as the shorter, post-1986 sample, which is out-of-sample for the statistical model.
16 Another possibility, suggested by Wayne Ferson, is to let the newsletters'
weights enter the conditional variance function in the GARCH model. This would
produce newsletter specific variance estimates. Of course, the cross-sectional dis-
persion of the newsletters' forecasts could be affected by the assumption about a
common expected volatility. However, in addition to the computational burden
of estimating a GARCH model for each newsletter at each point in time, many of
models would be fit over very small samples making it unlikely that the estimation
would converge.
20In terms of mean squared error and mean absolute errors, all four forecasts are
similar. The mean and median forecasts tend to do slightly better than the per-
formance weighted newsletter forecasts. The newsletters present better correct
direction counts (over the full sample 62.7%) than the statistical model. However,
all of the combined newsletter forecasts are positive. That is, there was never
a month where there was an average short market position. Hence, the correct
direction count is not that revealing.
The magnitude of the forecast as well as the direction provides a better mea-
sure of performance. We regress the market return on the forecasted market
returns from the different models. In the full sample (omitting the crash obser-
ration), the statistical model presents a 3% adjusted R2 whereas the newsletter
models all have zero R2s. Similar results are found in the post-1986 sample. The
out-of-sample adjusted R2 is 1% for the statistical model and negative 1% for the
newsletter models.
4.2 Volume, volatilit' and forecast dispersion
There is considerable interest in the relations between volume, volatility of price
changes and agents' forecasts. Harris and Raviv (1993) develop a model which has
implications about changes in the mean forecasted returns and volume. Shalen
(1993) presents a model where changes in the agents' forecast dispersion induce
trading. Her model predicts that increased dispersion will cause increased trading
volume and increased volatility. Our data provide an ideal setting to test these
predictions.
Ziebart (1990) examines the relation between a security's market-adjusted
volume, the change in dispersion of analyst's forecasts, and the absolute value of
the revision in the mean earnings forecast. He finds the dispersion and change in
the mean variables are significantly related to volume. This supports the Harris
and Raviv (1993) prediction.
Frankel and Froot (1990) present empirical results which suggest that volume.
21volatility and the standard deviation of forecasts across respondents to the weekly
Money Market Services international survey of currency exchange rates are all
positively correlated. They show that dispersion Granger-causes volume as well
as volatility. These results are consistent with the Shalen (1993)model.'7
Few have studied the equity market as a whole.18 The first two panels sum-
marize the contemporaneous correlations between dispersion, volatility, trading
volume, and the change in the aggregated newsletter forecasted return. Two
measures of volatility are examined. The first is the ex post volatility from the
daily S&P 500 returns converted to monthly. The second volatility is the implied
volatility on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange's Market Volatility IndexJ9
The panels show the correlations of the levels as well as first differences in
the levels. All of the variables are positively correlated. The correlations using
the historical volatility and the implied volatility are remarkably similar though
the implied volatility is only available over a shorter sample.
In panel B, we report a test of one of the Harris and Raviv (1993) predictions.
The Harris and Raviv model does not imply a causal relation between volume and
forecast change. Instead, the variables are positively correlated because they are
both driven by a third exogenous factor, namely a signal. In support of their
model, the contemporaneous correlation between the change in the absolute value
of the market forecast and volume is 38% and significant at the 1% level.
17 Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) also present a model which links dispersion
to volatility. Their model implies a negative relation, the opposite of Shalen's
(1993) prediction. O'Brien (1988) examines whether agents produce more accurate
earnings forecasts than mean or median forecasts. Tauchen and Pitts (1983) and
Gallant, Tauchen and Rossi (1992a,b) examine volume and volatility relation for
the market as a whole.
' The first published study is Cowles (1933). There are a number of studies
which analyze the semi-annual predictions of academic and business economists
published by Joseph Livingston in the Philadelphia Inquirer. See Lakonishok
(1980), Brown and Maital (1981), Pearce (1984) and Dokko and Edeistein (1989).
' See Harvey and Whaley (1992) for the methodology of constructing the im-
plied volatilities. See Whaley (1993) for a description of how a basket of volatilities
is combined into a single index. The time series properties of the index and data
are provided by Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1993).
22The third panel of Table 5 analyzes whether changes in dispersion Granger-
cause changes in volatility and NYSE volume (adjusted by the total number of
shares outstanding). The results show that dispersion Granger-causes both volume
and volatility which is consistent with predictions of Shalen (1993). These findings
are robust to the choice of proxy for volatility.
The final panel of table 5 shows the result of a one standard deviation shock in
the variables of interest. A shock in dispersion affects future levels of dispersion.
A one standard deviation shock increases future dispersion by 33% after three
month5. In addition, a one standard deviation jump in dispersion causes trading
volume to increase by 15% in the first month. Most importantly, there is an
economically significant relation between dispersion and market volatility. A one
standard deviation shock in dispersion implies a sharp jump market volatility iii
the first month. There is a reversal in the second month. The three month impact
of the innovation is an 11% increase in the level of volatility.
5. Conclusions
We analyze over 15,000 asset allocation recommendations from investment
newsletters from 1980—1992. The investment letters suggest a mixture of eq-
uity and cash. In contrast to mutual fund studies, we directly observethe asset
weights. Since the conditional market beta is unity and the conditional betaof
cash is zero, we bypass the risk estimation.
We nonparametrically assess the performance of the investment letters by
forming portfolios which incorporate their recommendations and comparing per-
formance against a fixed investment weight cash/S&P 500 portfolio which has the
same unconditional variance. We find that over 75% of the newsletters produce
negative abnormal returns. Some recommendations are remarkably poor.For
example, the (once) high profile Granville Market Letter—Traders produced an
average annual loss of 5.4% over the past 13 years. This comparesto a 15.9%
average annual gain on the Standard and Poor's 500 priceindex.
23Our tests focus on the ability of these analysts to call the direction of the
market —ormarket timing. We find little evidence that equity weights increase
before future positive market returns and decrease before negative market returns.
We argue that timing should be evaluated relative to the common-knowledge
degree of predictability in the economy. We propose astatistical model which
serves as a benchmark for the common level of predictability.We measure 'extra'
market timing as instances when equity weights increase (decrease) when the
common expected returns are negative (positive) and futurerealized returns are
positive (negative). We find no evidence that the investment letters as a group
have any knowledge over and above the common level of predictability.
We also examine whether performance is persistent. When we run cross-
sectional regressions of four-year performance on the previous four-year perfor-
mance, we can account for nearly 50% of the cross-sectional variance.This evi-
dence is much stronger than complementary evidence presented in mutual fund
studies. However, following Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), some
persistence could be induced by a survivorship bias when the cross-sections are
sampled. Consistent with this observation and when the measurement horizon is
shortened, there is little evidence of persistence of good performance. If the in-
vestment letter produced two consecutive years of positive abnormal performance,
there is less than 50% chance that the positive performance will persist in the next
year. However, there is formidable evidence of persistencein poor performance.
If the investment letter produced two consecutive years of negative abnormal per-
formance, there is almost a 70% chance that the next year's performance will also
be poor.
We infer each investment letter's assessment of the expected market return
from their recommendations. We construct various consensus metrics and find
that the consensus expectation contains little information about the future market
return. These results are consistent with our analysis of the individual newsletters.
Treated individually or aggregated, the newsletters offer little information about
the direction or the magnitude of market returns.
\'Vliile there is little value in the aggregate predicted market return, impor-
24tant information exists in the disagreement among the forecasters. Theoretical
models, such as the one proposed in Shalen (1993), show that increased disagree-
ment should predict both increased trading volume and increased volatility. The
standard deviation of the newsletters' forecasts provides a natural measure of dis-
agreement and we are able to provide the first tests of these predictionsfor broad
equity market return. Our evidence suggests that dispersion Granger-causesboth
volatility arid trading volume. In addition, our time-series analysisof the im-
pact of unanticipated increases in dispersion suggeststhat the measure has an
economically meaningful influence on both volume and volatility.
The bottom line is that very few newsletters can 'beat' the S&P 500 according
to the measures that we study. In addition, few can 'beat' the market forecasts
derived from a statistical representation of publicly available information. There
is no evidence that the letters can time the market (forecast the direction). Con-
sistent with mutual fund studies, 'winners' rarely win again and 'losers' often
lose again. Finally, while there is little value in the magnitude and the direc-
tion of aggregate forecast of the market return, there is important information
in the cross-sectional uncertainty or dispersion. Our results show that dispersion
anticipates both volume and volatility.
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28</ref_section>Table 1
Investment newsletter summary statistics, June 1980 to December 1992
Newslcuer S&P 500 MeasureIMeasure2
Forecast reurn renzmbNewsleaer S&P 500 abnormal abnormal
Invesrrnent newslcttcr (after t. costs) (after 1. cosIsI volaflhtv'volanhiry'ii&m4 £132'
STATISTICAL MODEL 80:06-92:120.171(0.154)0.159(0.158)0.124 0.1590.011" 0.014"
EQUALLY WEIGHTED NEWSLETTER 80:06-92:12 0.113(0.109)0.159(0.158)0.084 0.159 -0.015' .0042'
EQUALLY WEIGHTED NEWSLETIER (> 4 years)80:06-92:12 0.112(0.107)0.159(0.158)0.081 0.159 -0.016' -0.042'
DINES LETTER (SHORTING) 80:06-92:12 -4).004(-0.004)0.163(0.162)0.170 0.163 -0.170 .0 I6
DINES LETTER (NO SHORTING) 80:06-92:12 0.124(0.107)0.163(0.162)0.126 0.163 .0.039 -0.05(Y
DOW THEORY LETTERS 80:06-92:10 0.146(0.137)0.197(0.196) 0.095 0.139.0.026' 0.039
GRANVILLEMARKETLETTER (TRADERS) 80:06-92:12 -0.049(-0.054) 0.156(0.155) 0.155 0.163 -0.207' -0.215'
GRANVILLEMARKETLETTER(INVESTORS) 80:06-92:06 0.134(0.125)0.159(0.158) 0.119 0.166-0.015" .0.021"
MARKET LOGIC 80:06-92:12 0.144(0.143)0.139(0.138)0.139 0.167 0.012' . 0.014
PROFESSIONAL TAPE READER (MUTUAL FUND)80:06-92:112 0.130(0.114)0.165(0.164)0.072 0.164 -0.008 -0.017
PROF. TIMING SERVICE (SHORTING) 80:06-92:12 -0.018(-0.022) 0.200(0.199)0.148 0.142-0227' -0.216'
PROF.TIMLNGSERVICE (NOSHORTING) 80:06-92:120.139(0.121)0.200(0.199)0.071 0.142-002I' -0.043'
TELEPHONESWITCHNEWSLETTER 80:06-92:12 0.113(0.102)0.155(0.154)0.135 0.166-004I' .0050
VALUELLNEINVESTMENTSURVEY 80:06-92:120.144(0.141)0.157(0.156)0.103 0.141 0.003 0.004
ZWEIG FORECAST--MODELPORTFOLIO 80:06-92:12 0.130(0.120)0.159(0.158) 0078 0.159-0.001 -0.003
DLNES LETrER—SHORTTERM TRADING 80:06-92:12 0.110(0.096)0.159(0.158)0.096 0.159-0.034' -0.057'
PROFESSIONAL TAPE READER--MODEL 80:06-92:12 0.109(0099)0.158(0.157)0.069 0.159 -0.017' -0.040'
BOB NUROCKS ADVISORY )TMI:NO SHORT) 80:06-90:08 0.231(0.225)0.149(0.148)0.117 0.148 0.085' 0.110'
BOB NUROCKS ADVISORY (TMI.SHORTING) 80:06-90:08 0.199(0.199)0.149(0.147)0.144 0.148 0.051' 0.055.
OUTLOOK--MARKET ALLOCATION 80:06-92:12 0.144(0.142)0.189(0.187)0.095 0.155 -0.008' -0.012'
CHARTIST—ACTUAL CASH COUNT 80:07-92:12 0.121(0.115)0.152(0.151)0.098 0.157-0.OIT .0.020'
ELLIOTT WAVE THEORIST (INVESTORS) 80:07-92:10 0.119(0.108)0. 157(0. 156)0.143 0.167.0.041' -0.046'
GROWTH STOCK OUTLOOK 80:07-92:09 0.108(0.106)0.146(0.145)0.067 0.158 -0.005 .0.014"
CABOTMARK.ET LETTER--MODEL PORTFOLIO 80:12-92:12 0.129(0.124)0.148(0.147)0.131 0.161 .0.012' .0.015'
THE BIG PICTURE(NOSHORTING) 81:12-92:12 0.107(0.076)0.155(0.154)0.09! 0.160 -0.04-6' -0.08I'
THEBIG PICTURE--SGA--SHORTING ALLOWED81:12-92:12-0.033(-0.034) 0.155(0.154) 0.165 0.160 M.191 -0.184'
SYSTEMS & FORECASTS--TLMETREND 82:12-92:10 0.119(0.100)0.153(0.152)0.1430J58-0.045' .0.050'
THE BIG PICTURE--TRADING PORTFOLIO 82:12-92:120.116(0.110)0.162(0.161)0.080 0.157-0.008" -0.016'
PETERDAGINVESTMENTLETTER 82:12-92:12 0.140(0.135)0.162(0.161)0.091 0.158 0.010. 0.018'
CHARTIST--TRADERS 82:12-92:12 0.169(0.167)0.176(0.175)0.155 0.163 -0.004 -0004
SYSTEMS & FORECASTS (SHORT1NG 82:12-92:10 0.052(0.052)0.153(0.152)0.163 0.158 -0.103' -0.099
CALIFORNIA TECHNOLOGY STOCK LETTER 83:01-92:12 0.135(0.130)0.162(0.161)0.092 0.157 0.004 0.007
PRINCETON PORTFOLIOS--PORTFOLIO '2 83:01-92:12 0.114)0.102)0.168(0.167)0.070 0.157 -0.013' .0030
FUND EXCHANGE 83:12-92:12 0.160(0.148)0.194(0.193)0.101 0.142.0.010"-0.014"
BOB NUROCKS ADVISORY--MODEL 83:12-92:12 0.116(0.109)0J41(0.140)0.112 0.167-0.010" -0.015'
MARGOS MARKET MONITOR 84:01-92:12 0.187(0.183)0.202(0.201)0.128 0.141-0.007' -0.006
MARKETM.ANIA-TIMING ONLY 84:01-91:11 0.120(0.115)0.119(0.118)0.213 0.167-0.010 -0.008
INVESTECH MARKET ANALYST 84:01-92:07 0.114(0. 106)0167(0. 166)0.064 0168-0.003 -0.008
SPECULATOR TRADERS PORTFOLIO 84:01-89:09 0.132(0.120)0.184(0.I83)0.12! 0.174-0.032' -0.047'
INVESTECH MUTUAL FUND ADVISOR 84:12-92:07 0.122(0.111)0.154(0,152)0.089 0.182 0.001 0.002
MUTUAL FUND STRATEGIST (INVESTORS) 84:12-89:01 0103(0.089)0.223(0.220)0.167 0.189-0.116' -0.130'
MUTUAL FUND STRATEGIST (INTERMEDIATE) 84:12-92:09 0.076(0.049)0. 168(0. 167) 0122 0.170-0092' 0.129'
PROF. TLMING SERVICE (SHORT ON SELL) 84:12-88:12 0.200(0.176)0.316(0.310)0.089 0.116 -0.078' -0.100'
STOCKMARKET CYCLES (MUTUAL FUND) 84:12-92:08 0.072(0.052)0.152(0.151)0.127 0.169 -0.080' -0.108'
ZWEIG FORECAST (NO SHORT) 84:12-92:10 0.081(0.045)0.156(0.155)0.089 0.167 -0.071' -0.133'
WELLINGTON'S WORRY-FREE INVESTING 84:12-86:12 0.169(0.163)0.219(0.214)0.135 0.149 -0.041' .0.041'
PSR STOCKWATCH--MODEL 84:12-86:12 0.202(0.198)0.219(0.2 14)0.129 0.149-0001 0.003
HOLT INVESTMENT ADVISORY 84:12-86:08 0.026(-0.030) 0.327(0.320)0.045 0.1320J85' .0.523'
NAME UNKNOWN 84:12-85:06 O,217(O.20I)0.382(0.362)0.102 0.115 —0.I43 -0.146'
STOCKMARKET CYCLES MODEL) 84:12-92:12 0.052(0.037)0.150(0.149)0.107 0.173-0.082' -0.133'
MARKETARIAN—MUTUAL FUND INVESTOR 84:12-91:01 0.043(0.025)0.135(0.133)0.144 0.181-0.099' -0.123'
INVESTECI1 MUTUAL FUND ADVISOR 84:12-92:07 0.118(0.107)0.173(0.172) 0088 0.171-0.016' .0.031'
ZWEIG--ST TREND INDICATOR (SHORTING. 84:12-92:10 -O.068(-0.068) 0.156(0.155)0.173 0.167.0.226' .0.219'Investment ncwslcner
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STOCK MARKET CYCLES 84:12-90:110.069(0.054)0.116(0.112)0.0850.1420.046' -0.074
PROF. TIMING SERVICE (CASH ON SELL) 85:01-88:120.051(0.045)0.316(0.310)0.1300.116-0.303' -0.262'
NOURSE REPORT 85:01-87:010.296(0.288)0.317(0.312)0.162O.I67-0.021' -0.017'
MARJCETARIANMODEL STOCK PORTFOLIO 85:01-92:120.111(0.103)0.167(0.166)0.1120.166-0.033' -0.049'
NICHOLSON REPORT—MMI 85:01-88:080.084(0.055)0.172(0.169)0.1750.196-0.IOT -0118'
PLAIN TALK INVESTOR (HIGH RISK) 85:01-92:120.121(0.111)0.167(0.166)0.0900.166-0.011' .0.020'
PLAIN TALK INVESTOR-- 'PERSONAL BEST 85:01-92:120.121(0.114)0.167(0.166)0.1360166-0.036 -0.044'
SYSTEMS & FORECASTS--MUTUAL FUND 85:01-88:010.113(0.091)0.192(0.189)0.1000.209-0.038' -O.082
GRANVII_LE—INVESTORS 85:01-90:120.164(0.157)0.171(0.167)00790.1440030' 0.059'
SWiTCH FUND ADVISORY 85:01-88:110.134(0.130)0.177(0174)0.1100.191-0.002 -0.003
INVESTORS INTELLIGENCE (SWITCH FUND) 85:01-92:120.141(0.130)0.161(0.160)00760.1690.021' 005I'
INVESTORS INTELUCIENCE 85:01-90:110092(0.078)0.128(0. 124)0.0800150-0.025' -0.045'
GRANVILLE.-TRADERS 85:01-90:12-0.049(-0 059)0173(0170)0.108 0.146-0.20T .0.274'
HOWARD RIJFFS RUFF TIMES 85:01-92:120.102(0.091)0199(0.197)0088 0.134-0.061' -0.095'
HOWARD RIJFF—OSH I 85:01-90:120.036(0.024)0.155(0.151)0.078 0.145-0.095 -0.I71
IUGH TECHNOLOGY GROWTH STOCKS (TIMING)85:04-88:120.151(0.148)0158(0155)0200 0.201-0010' -0.006'
NAME UNKNOWN 85:04-85:110178(0173)0.241(0.236)0.088 0.127-0.016' -0011...
ELUOTI WAVE THEORIST (TRADERS) 85:12-92:11-0.129(-0.148)0.148(0.147)0.188 0.174.0.302' .0.279
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY STOCK LETTER 85:12-92:070.299(0.297)0.304(0.301)0.134 0.138 0.001 0.004
MUTUAL FUND INVESTING (BALANCED GROW)85:12-92:120.128(0.125)0.152(0.150)0.108 0.1750004"' 0.010.
BOB BRINKERS MARK.ETITMER—AGGR.ESSIVE 85:12.91:010.149(0.140)0.239(0.235)0.106 0.152-0.049' -0.070
BOB BRINKERS MARKETTIMER-S}IORT ON SELL85:12-86:050.162(0.162)0.513(0.489)0.183 0.131-0.565' -0.352'
DOW THEORY COMMENT—PRIMARY TREND 85:12-86:120.139(0.133)0.185(0.175)0170 0.179-0.045' -0.038"
NO-WAD FUND INVESTOR—WEALTH BUILDER 85:12-92:120.100(0.098)0.124(0.122)0.161 0.181-0.021' -0.022'
THE BIG PICTURE—MODEL PORTFOLIO 85:12-92:120.152(0.147)0.201(0.199)0125 0.174-0.015' 0.020
ADDISON REPORT—MONITORED SPECULATIVE 85:12-92:120.117(0.109)0.144(0.143)0.143 0.172-0.023' -0.02T
MARGO'SMAR.KETMONITOR(MUTUALFUND) 85:12-92:080.129(0.112)0.13.4(0.132)0.107 0.1770003 0.006
STOCKMARKET CYCLES--HOURLY FUND SWITCH85:12-90:110.046(0.019)0.128(0.126)01390.189-0.096' -0.129'
DOW THEORY COMMENT--SECONDARY TREND86:01-87:060.221(0.198)0.317(0.3 10)0.111 0.178.0.020 -0.028
FUNDLINE 86:01.90:120.116(0.099)0.131(0.129)0.157 0.188-0.025 -0.028'
MUTUAL FUND MONITOR--TRADERS 86:01-86:020.535(0.52!)0.594(0.534)0.1590176.0.015' 0.043'
GAR.SIDE FORECAST (NO SHORTING) 86:12-92:120.129(0113)0.132(0.130)0.0700.1730.020 0.055'
GARSIDE FORECAST (SHORTING) 86:12-92:120.020(0020)0.132(0.130)0.177 0.173-0.113' -0.108
FIDELITY MONITOR—GROWTH PORTFOLIO 86:12-92:120.250(0.247)0287(0.283)0.1170136-0.004 -0.001
DONOGHUES MONEYLETFER—VENTURESOME 86:12-92:120.113(0.108)0.145(0.143)0.150 0.172-0.028 -0.030'
PUETZ INVESTMENT ALERT--AGGRESSIVE 86:12-88:090.158(0147)0.106(0.100)0.201 0.237 0.045 0.059
OMALLEY'S FIDELITY WATCH 86:12-87:100.081(OA)8I)0.081(0069)0.312 0.3120.000 0.012
INVESTMENT HORIZONS 86:12-92:120.124(0.121)02I0(0.208)0.094 0.171-0.023 -0.044'
DOWSE MARKET LETTER--EQUJTIES ALLOC. 86:12-88:110.098(0.092)0.161(0.156)0.211 0.221-0.065' -0.064
PERSONAL FINANCE—ST MUTUAL FUND 86:12-92:120.108(0.090)0.123(0.121)0.1500181-0.025' -0.028'
PRIME INVESTMENT ALERT—EQUITY MODEL 86:12-90:070.084(0.070)0.194(0192)0.165 0.195-0.I06 0.124'
MUTUAL FUN!) SWITCH SERVICE 86:12-89:120.077(0.073)0.179(0175)0178 0.199-0.096 -0.104'
CABOT MAJJCET LETTER--MUTUAL FUND 86:12-89:080.179(0170)0.204(0.199)0172 0.222.0.006 -0.004
PROF. TAPE READER (SHORT TERM. NO SHORT)86:12-92:120.091(0.061)0. 152(0.150)0.131 0.179.0.069 -0.094'
PROF. TAPE READER (SHORTTER.M. SHORTING)86:12-92:12-O.06I(-O.061)0.152(0.150)0.184 0.179-0.215 .0.207'
PROF. TAPE READER (INTERMED. SHORTING) 86:12-92:030.105(0.105)0.180(0176)0.226 0.222.0.077" 0.072"
PROF. TAPE READER (INTERMED.. NO SHORT)















MUTUAL FUND FORECASTER 86:12-92:120.127(0.127)0.145(0.142)0.185 0.196-0.014' -0.012'
B! RESEARCH 86:12-92:120.177(0.172)0.206(0.204)0.109 0.142 0.000 0.001
PERSONAL FINANCE--GROWTH PORTFOLIO 86:12-92:120.184(0.181)0.197(0.195)0.158 0.170.0.007" M.007'
















PROF. TAPE READER (LONG TERM. SHORTING)87:01-92:08 -0.123(-0.125)0.217(0.214)0.203 0.195.0.347' -0332'
PROF. TAPE READER (LONG TERM. NO SHORT)87:01-92:080.065(0.052)0.217(0.214)0.165 0.195.0.142' -0168'Iivestinent newslcitcr
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EQUALLY WEIGHTED LETTER (Posi.I986) 87:01-92:12 0.079(0.075)0.118(0116)0.091
EQUALLY WEIGHTED LETTER (Post'86: > 4 yrs)87:01-92:12 0079(0.074)0,118(0.116)0.083
STATISTICALMODEL (Post-1986) 87:01-92:12 0.149(0.137)0.l18{0.116)0.104
STATISTICAL MODEL (Post-1986, exceptOct.87) 87:01-92:12 0.168(0.148)0168(0.166) 0.095
VOLUME REVERSAL SURVEY—INDEX PORT. 87:01-91:06 0.092(0.072)0.164<0.161)0.174
NEW MUTUAL FUND ADVISOR-GROWTH 87:01-88:01 0.499(0.496)0.582(0.571)0.120
SWITCH FUND TIMING—CONSERVATIVE 87:01-92:12 0.138(0.120)0.21 1(0.208)0.087
SWITCH FUND TIMING—MODEL STOCK PORT. 87:01-92:12 0.040(0.026)0.151(0.149)0.077
SECTOR FUNDS NEWSLETTER—MODEL PORT. 87:01-92:12 0.010(-0.007) 0.I40(0138) 0279
WALL STREET GENERALIST—SELECT TRADING87:01-92:12 0.186(0.129)0.140(0.138)0.608
VOLUME REVERSAL SURVEY-TIMING ONLY 87:01-90:08 0.060(0.033)0.119(0.116)0.250
ITA MUTUAL FUND ADVISOR—GROWTH 87:01-87:05 0.226(0.203)0.596(0.572) 0053
DINES LETFER-[NTERMED. TREND (SHORTING)87:12-92:07 -0.019(-0.025)0.158(0.155)0.1)8
DINES LETFER-INTERMED. TREND (NO SHORT) 87:12-92:07 Q.008(-0.002)0. 158(0. 155)0.127
DINES LETTER—LONG TERM—NO SHORTING 87:12-92:07 0.024(0.010)0.232(0.246)0.081
DINES LE1'TER—LONG TERM-SHORTING 87:12-92:07 -0224('0.224) 0.252(0.246) 0139
FUTURES HOTLINE—STOCK MUTUAL FUND 87:12-92:08 0.109(0.076)0.146(0)44)0.08)
lARMONIC RESEARCH (NO SHORTING) 87:12-88:07 0.039(0.024)0.222(0.205)0.018
HE BIG PIC'DJRE (MASTER KEY—NO SHORT) 87:12-92:11 0.141(0J28)0.144(0.142)0.113
THE BIG PICTURE—MASTER TECH. (SHORTING)87:12-88:11 0.162(0.162)0.162(0.151)0.105
KINSMAN'S LOW-RISK GROWTH LETTER 87:12-92:12 0.134(0.129)0.190(0.188)0.091
NEY MUTUAL FUND REPORT--GROWTH PORT. 87:12-92:12 0.099(0.093)0.209(0.206)0.044
PERSONAL PORTFOLIO MANAGER 87:12-89:12 0.209(0.203)0.239(0.234)0.089
WALL STREET DIGEST STOCK AND BOND PORT. 87:12-92:12 0.142(0.131)0.166(0.164)0.100







ADDISON REPORT-MUTUAL FUND ALLOC.
HIGH TECHNOLOGY GROWTH STOCKS
TIMER DIGEST.-' CASPER' SHORTING)





TIMER DIGEST- '5 & 10 CONSEN. (NO SHORT)
TIMER DIGEST-' 5 & 10 CONSEN. (SHORTING)
THE PRUDENT SPECULATOR
BOB NUROCK'S ADVISORY-SECTOR FUND INV.
BLUE CHIP VALUES--GROWTH PORTFOLIO
CABOTS FUND NAVIGATOR-GROWTH & INC.
CABOTS FUND NAVIGATOR-GROWTH PORT.
CHARTIST MUTUAL FUND TIMER
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WALL ST. GENERALIST—ST INDIC. (NO SHORT)88:12-89:05 0.204(0.204)0.460(0.436) 0.1670.127-0.393 -0.260
WALL ST. GENERALIST—ST INDICATOR (SHORT) 88:12-89:05 0.353(0.337)0.460(0.436) 0.1330.127-0.144 -0.111
BOB NUROCKS ADVISORY-ELVES ST (SHORTS)88:12-92:10 -0.117(-0.118) 0.168(0.165) 0.1480.145-0.288 -0.279
BOB NUROCK'S ADVISORY-ELVES ST(NO SHRT)88:12-92:10 0.062(0.048)0.168(0.165) 0.1020.145-0.089' -0.127'
CRAWFORD PERSPECTIVES--NO SHORTING 88:12-92:07 0.071(0.049)0.163(0.160) 0.1230.148-0.099' -0.117'
PAD SYSTEM REPORT—AGGRESSIVE PORT. 88:12-92:12 0.134(0.130)0.141(0.138) 0.1060.145 0.010' 0.016'
INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO CLOSED-END FUNDS 89:01-92:12 0.133(0.127)0.157(0.155) 0.1090.142-0.009' -0.010.
WALL ST. GENERALIST—TOP TRENDS (NO SHRT) 89:01-89:06 0.052(0M23) 0.356(0i36) 0.061 0.126-0.187 -0.379'
WALL ST. GENERALIST—TOP TRENDS (SHORTS)89:01-89:06 -0.282(-0.290) 0.356(0.336) 0.1290.126-0653' -0.618'
CABoT'S MUTUAL FUND NAVIGATOR-INCOME 89:01-92:12 0.134(0.128)0.225(0.221) 0.101 0.138-0.052'. -0.071
WALL STREET GENERALIST--LONG-TERM FUND 89:01-92:08 0.143(0.140)0159(0.156) 0.1270.148-0.006 -0.004'
WALL STREET GENERALIST—INTER.MED. FUND 89:01-92:10 0J21(O.116) 0136(0133) 0.125 0.146-00l0' -0.009'
BOB NUROCK'S ADVISORY—INDEX FUND 89:01-92:12 0101(0.089)0.193(0.196)0.0760.141-0.044' -0.082'
CRAWFORD PERSPECTIVES-I00% SHRTON SELL 89:01-92:12 -0.002(-0011) 0.157(0.155)0.1330.142-0.162' -0.171'
WALL STREET GENERALIST—SELECT INTER. 89:01-92:12 0151(0.140)0.154(0.151)0.1620.143-0.025' -0.019"
AGBIOTECH STOCK LETIER--MODEL PORT. 89:12-92:12 0.121(0.117)0.120(0.113)0.135 (L133-0.0G4 0004'
HOWARD RUFF'S RUFF TIMES—OSH PORT. 89:12-92:12 0.044(0032)0.108(0.105)0.0860.147-0.05T -0.095'
KEN GERBINO INVESTMENT LETTER 89:12-91:07 0.110(0.104)0.098(0.092)0.1240.1700.011 0.020
1.10 NO LOAD FUND ANALYST--PORTFOLIO A 89:12-92:12 0.147(0.146)0.144(0.138)0.135 0.1440.008' 0.014'
L/G NO LOAD FUND ANALYST--PORTFOLiO B 89:12-92.12 0.092(0,091)0.093(0.086)0.122 0.132 0.001 0.009'
LIUTUAL FUND INVESTING--MAX. GROWTH 89:12-92:12 0.117(0.114) 0116(0112) 0.151 0.152-0.002 0.002
.0 LOAD SELECT/TIMING: INTER. (SHORTS) 89:12-92:12 0087(0.062) 0i08(0J05) 0.136 0.147-0.043 .0.044
NO LOAD SELECT/TIMING: INTER (NO SHORT)89:12-92:11 0.111(0.074)0.107(0J04) 0.096 0.149-0.017 -0.024
N. L. SELECTJTIMING: PRIMARY (SHORT) 89:12-92:12 -0.076(-0.093) 0J24(0.I20) 0.121 0.157 -O.203 -0.256'
N. L. SELECT/TIMING: PRIMARY (NO SHRT) 89:12-92:04 -O.022(-O.037) 0.147(0.140) 0094 0.187-0.146 -0.275'
N. L. SELECT./TII4ING: INTERM. TERM PORT. 89:12-92:12 0.132(0.105)0.108(0.105)0.0770.1470.020' 004I'
OVERPRICED STOCK SERVICE 89:12-91:06 0.061(0.048)0.070(0.063) 0.1440.172-0.024 41.022
PRICE TREND—TECH. TRENDS (NO SHORTING) 89:12-91:07 0.039(0.023)0.098(0.092)0.1490.170-0.073 .0.077'
PRICE TREND--TECH. TRENDS (SHORTING) 89:12-91:07 -0.070(-0.070) 0.098(0.092)0.1720.170-0.168' -0.161'
PRICE TREND (NO SHORTING) 89:12-91:07 0.021(-0.001) 0.098(0.092)0.1230.170-0.094 -0.124'
PRICE TREND (S1-IORTING) 89:12-91:07 -0.I23(-0.126) 0.098(0.092)0.1700.170.0.224' -0.21T
PRICE TREND—MODEL PORTFOLIO 89:12-91:07 0.005(-0.009) 0.110(0.103)0.2830A71.0.126' 0.072'
SCOTF LETTER--EQUITY PORTFOLIO 89:12-90:08 -0.030(-0.040) .0.096(-0.III) 0.166 0.2000026' 0.045'
SWITCH FUNDTLvIING-CONSERVATIVE 89:12-92:12 0.146(0.129)0.116(0.112)0.0940.152 0.034' 0060'
HOWARD RUFF--OSH 2 89:12-90:12 -0.069(-0.081) -0.032(-0.042) 0.0870.1840.109' .0.200'
INVESTOR'S GUIDE/CLOSED-END FUNDS: II 90:01-92:12 0.088(0.077)0.108(0.105)0.101 0.147-0.017' -0.022"
SY HARDING INVESTOR FCRICASTS--PORT. 2 90:01-92:12 0.096(0.074)0.108(0.105)0.0770.147.0.011 -0.020
TIlE CI-IARTIST MUTUAL FUND ThMER 90:01-90:12 0.078(0.074) -0.032(-0.042) 0.005 0.184-0.002 .0.071
SY HARDING--MUTUAL FUND PORT. 90:01-90:12 0.074(0.045) -0.032(-0.042) 0.085 0.184 0.015 0.041
LYNN ELGERT LETTER--MUTUAL FUND ALLOC. 90:01-91:10 0,075(0.062)0.062(0.052)0.0360.137-0.007 .0.026
INVESTORS INTELUGENCE--LONG-TEP.M STOCK 90:01-92:12 0.140(0.132)0.108(0.105)0.094 0.147 0.040' 0.068
SY HARDING INVESTOR FORECASTS--PORT. I 90:01-92:12 0.057(0.044)0108(0.105)0.061 0.147.0.036' .0.085'
INVESTORS INTELLIGENCE--LOW-PRICED STO 90:01-92:12 0.094(0.090)0.108(0.105)0.117 0.147.0.009 0.009"
P.Q. WALL FORECAST 90:01-92:12 -0.073(-0.089) 0.108(0.105)0.127 0.147-0.191 -0.215'
MARKET MANIA—LONG TERM MUTUAL FUND 90:01-92:10 0.104<0.101)0.115(0.115)0.106 0.152 0.001 0.006
SY HARDING INVESTOR FORECASTS--PORT. 3 90:01-92:12 0.085(0.072)0.108(0. 105)0.049 0.1470.003 .0.009
DOW THEORY FORECASTS--EQUITY ALLOC 90:01-91:01 -0.121(-0.131) -0.051(-0.062) 0.146 0.186-0.109 -0.122'
CABOT MKT. LETTER-CONSERVATIVE GROWTH 90:01-92:12 0.103(0.099)0.105(0.101)0.127 0.146 OMOO 0.003
LYNN ELGERT LETTER--TRADERS STOCK PORT.90:01-91:11 0.027(0.019)0M68(0.063)0.037 0.159.0.051' -0.200
BIG PICTURE--MONETARY FORC. (NO SHORT) 90:12-91:09 0.282(0.282)0.282(0.269)0.125 0.123 0.000 0.013
THE BIG PIC'rURE--MONETARY FORC. (SHORTS)90:12-91:09 0.282(0.282)0.282(0.269)0.1250125 0.000 0.013
INVESTOR'S GUIDE/CLOSED-END FUNDS-Ill 90:12-92:12 0.143(0.136)0.186(0.181)0.076 0.1240.006" 0.013"
INVESTORS GUIDEJ CLOSED.END FUNDS-IV 90:12-92:12 0.154(0.147)0.186(0.181)0.084 0.124 0.007 0.015"
RETIREMENT LETTER 9012-91:12 0.241(0.240)0.305(0.295)0.118 0.158 0.000 0009'Newsletter S&P 500 Measure Mcaaure2
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EQUITY FUND OUTLOOK--AGR.ESSIVE 90:12-92:12 0.183(0178)0.186(0.181)0.1230.124-0.006 -0.001
PQ WALL--MUTUAL FUND MODEL 90:12-92:05 0.039(0.014)0.214(0.207)0.0700.140-0.117 -O.234
MUTUAL FUND TECH. TRADER-AGRESSIVE 90:12-92:12 0.155(0.147)0.186(0.181)0.1330.124-0.048 -o.oo
THEBIG PICTURE—MASTER KEY—SHORTING 90:12-92:11 0.141(0.124)0.186(0.181)0.1220.127-0.057 -0.054
HUSSMAN—MUTUAL FUND 91:01-92:12 0.253(0.238)0.186(0.181)0.1650.1240.008 0.0i0
RICHARD BAND'S PROFITABLE INVESTING 91:01-92:12 0.125(0.123)0.129(0.124)0.091 0.1030.004 0.009
CZESCHINS MUTUAL FUND OUTLOOK 91:01-92:12 0.066(0.072)0.186(0.181)0.0680.124-0049 -0.090
CONTRARIANS VIEW--TIAA/CREF SWITCH PL 91:01-92:12 0.143(0.121)0.186(0.181) 0.081 0.124-0.015 -0.020
GLOBAL FUND TIMER—U.S. PORTFOLIO 91:01-92:12 0.114(0.090)0.186(0.181) 0.0670.124.0.030 -0.056
FUNDLINE—TIMtNG PORTFOLIO 91:01-92:12 0.155(0.140)0.186(0.181) 0.0960.124-o.Oir-0.Ol4
PQ WALL—STOCK TIMING MODEL 91:01-92:tl -0081(-0.093) 0.186(0.181) 0.118 0.127-0269 -0.285
LYNN ELGERTLETrER—INVESTORS STOCKS 91:01-91:11 0.103(0.092)0.189(0.178) 0.0540.129-0.020-0.o4
BLUE CHIP CORRELATOR 91:01-92:12 0.151(0.145) -0.186(0.181)0.0880.1240.001 0.005
NO LOAD PORFOUOS--AGGRESSIVE GROWTH 91:01.92:12 0.109(0.100)0.186(0.181) 0.079 0.124-0.034 -0.051
FUND KINETICS 91:12-92:12 0.077(0.076)0.077(0.067) 0.074 0.074 -0.001 0009
NATIONAL TRENDLINES--STOCK TIMING 91:12.92:11 0.111(0.099)0.069(0.058) 0.064 0.0770.03C O.053
TODD MAREFF TIMER-STOCK FUND TIMING 91:12-92:12 0.008(-0.022) 0.077(0.067)0.057 0.074-0.090 -0.105
FINANCIAL PREDICTIONS—CONSERVATIVE 91:12-92:12 0.068(0.062) 0077(0067) 0.052 0.074 -0.003 O.O06
FINANCIAL PREDICTIONS--SPECULATIVE PORT.91:12-92:12 0.078(0.073)0.077(0.067)0.0590.0740.004 0.015.
TOP PERFORMING STOCK OUTLOOK 91:12-92:09 0.023(0.019)0.033(0.020) 0.050 0.078-0.015. -0012
VANGUARD ADVISOR—AGGRESSIVE GROWTH 91:12-92:12 0.077(0.075)0.077(0.067) 0.0740074-0.002 0.008
CLOSED END FUND DIGEST--GLOBAL GROWTH92:01-92:12 0.054(0.050)0.077(0.067)0.055 0.074-0.016 -0.012
ASSET ALLOCATER 92:01-92:12 0.044(0.030)0.077(0.067) 0040 0.074-0.025. -0.043
US INVESTMENT REPORT-AGGRESSIVE GROWTH 92:01-92:12 0.045(0.026)0.077(0.067)0.063 0.074-0.045. -0.043
FUND PROFIT ALERT 92:01-92:12 0.074(0.070)0.077(0.067)0.075 0.074 -0.OOT 0.002
US INVESTMENT REPORT--GROWTH PORTFOLIO 92:01-92:12 0.058(0.042)0.077(0.067)0.0700.074 M.032 0.025
Y HARDING INVESTOR FORECASTS--EQUITIES92:11-9212 0.272(0.232)0.3 19(0.259)0.042 0.0500.032 0.020
Percentposztive: 15.6% 22.7%
Percent greater than.025: 68%
Post-1986,percent positive: 17.9% 24.9%
Post-1986, percent 8reacer than .025: 8.3%
Annuali.zed returnsfor individual newsletters. The return after Iransactionscosts (of 1% perround-trip) appears inparenthesis.
bAnnualized returnfor theStandardandPoor's500indexmatched tothe monthsfor which a newsletter recommendationis
available.
'Annualized standard deviation of returns.
dAbnom.. return a newsletter earns abovethatfor a constant-weight cashiequity portfolio which has the same volatility as the
newsletter.
Abnormal return, above that for S&P500,for a constant-weight portfolio which invests in the newsletter and cash, but is levere
(or unlevered) to have ths ame volatility as the S&P 500.
rThe percentages at the bottom of the table exclude the equally weighted newsletter and the statistical model.
Statistically significant at 5%level.
Statistically significant at 10% level.
Statistically significant at 15% level.Table 2























(3) Market conditions, r,,L,÷,>0:
Adj. R2: 0. 1241
Equally-weighted coefficient:
p-value:









































































Percent positive, all lettersTable 2 (continued)



















(3) Market conditions, r,,.,,1>0:
Adj. R2: 0. 1297
Equally-weighted coefficient:
p-value:









































































Percent positive, all lettersCoefficients for the following regressions indicate the direction of change of the investment weights (Panel
A) or the demeaned level of the investment weights (Panel B) for newsletter i. The Panel A regressions
are of the form:
Market conditions model: r,,,,,, =ô +B,w +oz,+
Indicatorregression: w=ö I(r1÷1) + +
Timing Model: v= O2l(r11 &EJrJ)+ O3I(r-1., &EJr,,J)
OI(r,+,&EJr,÷J)+O5Ifr-fj &EJr.,:+J)+
where future market return, w is the investment weight in the equity market for newsletter i in period
t,Zis a set of public information variables available at time t,l(r,1)denotes a dummy variable equal to
one when the market is positive and i(r,1 &EJr,+J) denotes an indicator dummy equal to one when the
market return and the expected market return are both positive. The instrumental variables in Z are the
lagged excess return on the CRSP equally-weighted NYSE index, the lagged excess return on a 3-month
treasury bill, the lagged Moody's Baa-Aaa yield spread, the lagged excess dividend yield on the S&P 500
index, and a January dummy variable.
The panel B regressions replace with demeaned values of w The last row of each panel subsets each
of the variables in the timing model for expected increases or decreases in volatility. The coefficients in
the last row which are shown in bold are unambiguous, in the sense that the expected change in volatility
and the realized market return give reinforcing implications about optimal investment weights. The
reported coefficients, p-values, and adjusted R2s are for the average newsletter. F-statistic p-values are
shown for the last three regressions in each panel because they have no intercept and R2 does not have its



































Panel B: Persistence probabilities
Positive abnormal return:
Pr(Measure2>0 I Measure21.1>0) =0.373
319 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure2.1 >0
Pr(Measure2, >0 Measure21 and Measure2.2 >0) =0.476
103 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure2.1 and Measure2.2 >0
Pr(Measure21>0 Measure2 through Measure2.3>0,) =0.452
31 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure211 through Measure2,.3 >0
Pr(Measure21 >0 Measure2.1 through Measure21.. >0) =0.545
11 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure2.1 through Measure24> 0
Negative abnormal return:
Pr(Measure21 <0 IMeasure21.1<0) =0.676
624 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure2. <0
Pr(Measure2, <0 I Measure2 and Measure2.2 <0) =0.665
331 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure2. <0 and Measure2L.2 <0
Pr(Measure2, <0 Measure2 through Measure2L3 <0,) =0.711
166 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure2.1 through Measure21.) <0
Pr(Measure21 <0 IMeasure21through Measure2 <0) =0.762
101 newsletter-year observations meet the condition that Measure21.1 through Measure2 <0
Panel A shows results for a cross-sectional regression of "four-year" abnormal returns, represented
by the second nonpararnetric performance measure, on lagged four-year returns. To qualify as a four-
year return, a monthly return series must be cumulated over at least 36 months in the four-year period
listed. The 1980-1984 period can contain as many as 54 monthly returns.
Panel B presents the probability that the second nonparametric performance measure is positive, given
that it was positive in the previous period(s), and likewise for negative abnormal returns. Measure2
is the increast n return over the S&P500return obtained by levering (or unlevering) a newsletter
strategy by increasing (or decreasing) the portion of the investment which is long the equity market,
so that the strategy's volatility is identical to that for the S&P 500 over the same investment period.Table 4
Evaluating forecasts of the market return
Comparing actual ri,,,,



































































































































An implied forecast of for each newsletter can be obtained from the expression Ejr,1+J—X,E,[a+z/wv, which
is derived for agents with negative exponential utility. EJr,1,J is the expected excess return on the assets in
a portfolio formed by following newsletter i'srecommendations,is the newsletter-specific coefficient of
relative risk aversion, ais the variance of the market and w are the newsletter-specific weights. Table 4
presents the rescics of comparing these forecasts to the actual S&P500monthly return. Results are shown for
the mean forecast, the median forecast, a weighted average with weights which are the inverse of the previous
periods squared forecast error, and a statistical model. The statistical model predicts the market return using
five insu-uments: the lagged excess return on the CRSP equally-weighted NYSE index, the lagged excess returnon a 3-month treasury bill, the lagged Moody's Baa-Aaa yield spread, the lagged excess dividend yield on the
S&P 500 index, and a January dummy variable. The bottom two rows of results are out-of-sample in the sense
that the statistical model was originally fit to data through December 1986.
3The adjusted-[tof aregression of the actual monthly S&P 500 on the forecasted return.
bMeanabsoluteforecast error.
eThe percentage of forecasts which were positive when the market was positive or negative when the market
was negative.
The average monthly forecast of rmasimplied by investment newsletters.
'The average monthly S&P 500 return.Table 5





























































































































































Panels A and B contain the contemporaneous correlations of monthly observations for the listed variables.
Panel A presents the results for first differences of the data while Panel B presents results for level values.
Panel C displays F-statistics which can be used to infer which of the variables cause the others, in the
Granger sense. The variables in the first two and last two rows of Panel C are dependent variables in an
unrestricted regression which has twelve explanatory variables: three lags each of dispersion, historical
volatility, volume per share, and the first absolute difference of the mean forecast. The regressions
involving implied volatility substitute lags of implied volatility in place of lags of historical volatility. TheF-statistic tests the difference in the sum of squared errors between the unrestricted regression and a
restricted regression which drops the three lags of the candidate causal variable. A significant F-statistic
implies that the candidate variable Granger-causes the dependent variable. Resultsfor Panel C are shown
both with and ihout the October 1987 data point.
Panel D shows the cumulative percentage increase in the variables listed in the first column for one, two
and three periods ahead resulting from a shock to the variables listed in the top row. The shock takes the
form of a one standard deviation increase in the current period value of the shocked variable. The
coefficients used to gauge the effect of the shocks in Panel D are obtained from the unrestricted regressions
run for Panel C. The results (not shown) of repeating the analysis using implied volatilityin Panel D,
rather than historical volatility, are not substantially changed.
Dispersion measures the standard deviation over the cross-section of implied market returnforecasts
across non-missing observations for a sample of 237 investment newsletters foreach month in the period
1980:07 through 1992: 12.
bMonthly historical volatility is obtained by summing squared daily returns plus twotimes the
autocovariance for daily S&P 500 returns.
clmplied volatility is for the S&P 100 index and exists starting in January 1986.
4Volume per share is monthly NYSE volume for all shares divided by total number of shares outstanding.
'The absolute value of the first difference of the mean forecast is based on the average of the implied
market forecasts made by the newsletters.
indicates significant at a= 0.05Figure 1
Mean-standard deviation analysis





Figure 1 contains scatter plots for mean annualized returns versus annualized standard deviations. Data are
presented fornewslettersas well as an equally-weighted newsletter portfolio (circle), a statistical model
(diamond)and theS&P500index(star). Panels A and Ccontain all newsletters;panels B andDcontain
newsletterswhich have provided recommendations for at least 49 months. PanelsAand B have results
calculated over the period 1980.06-1992:12, for months in which a newsletter makes a recommendation. Panels
C and D use data from 1987:01-1992:12, which is entirely out of sample for the statistical model.
E(rJ 0
A: All years, all newsletters
E[r]
C: Post-1986, all newsletters
E[rJ 06
a:
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A: Measure 1 all newsletters B: Measure 2, all newsletters
Figure 2 shows the distrsbutions of twosummarymeasuresofnewsletter performance.MeasureI is the extra
remrn anewsletter earns above that for a constant-weight cash/equity portfolio which has the same volatility
as thenewsletter.Measure 2 is the extra return, above that for the S&P 500index, fora constarn-weight
portfolio which invests in thenewsletterand cash, but is Levered (or unlevered) to achieve the same volatility
as the S&P 500 index. Panels A and B of Figure 2 contain data on all newsletters; panels C and D contain data
for newsletters which have provided recommendations for at least 49 months.
C: Measure 1, letters existing > 4 years D: Measure 2, letters existing > 4 yearsFigure 3: Market Timing
Panel A: A w model
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Panel B: demeaned w model
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Panel A of Figure 3 presents the distribution of coefficients, across individual newsletter regressions, for
the timing model:
Timing Model: w= O,1(r,., &EJr,,J)+ 031(r., &EJr,,J)
O4l(r11 &Ejr. 1)+ &Ejrr,.J) +
where v0isthe investment weight in the equitymarketfor newsletter i in period Iand1(r,0, &E,/r+,J)
denotes an indicator dummy equal to one when the market return and the expected market return are both
positive. The Panel B regressions replace 4w1 with the demeaned level of w. The shaded portion at the
top of each bar represents the frequency of coefficients which are significantly different from zero at Lhe
10% level. Positive values of 9 and 04 indicate superior performance as do negative values of 03 and 0..
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Analysis of performance persistence






Figure 4 shows scatters of the cross-section of four-year abnot-mal returns (vertical axis) and lagged four-year
abnormai returns (horizontal axis), where measure 2 is used to define abnormal return. To qualify as a four-
year return, a monthly return series must be cumulatedover atleast 36monthsin the four-year period listed.
The 1980-1984 period can contain as many as 54 monthly returns.






















Distribution of the newsletters' implied coefficients of relative risk aversion
Figure 5 presents the disu-ibution of the coefficient of relativeriskaversion, A,, for each newsletter as estimated
fromE[rJ=A(var[r,/-var[E(r, Z)J)w4, which is derived for agents with negative exponential utility. E(r,J is the
expected excess rerurn on the assets us a portfolio formed by following newsletter i'srecommendations.A is
thenewsletter-specific coefficient of relative risk aversion, E is the variance of the market and w, are the
newsletter-specific weights.
1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-66-77-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11_12121313_1414-1515-1616-17
Coefficient of relative risk aversion